Lifeline　networks　are　critical　to　urban　economies　and　societies.　Resilience　is　an　emerging　concept　for　analyzing　the　dynamic　performances　of　critical　infrastructures　impacted　by　natural　hazards　or　attacks.　Although　many　studies　have　examined　how　to　assess　the　resilience　of　lifeline　networks　to　natural　disasters,　very　few　have　investigated　resilience　to　intentional　attacks.　This　study　presents　a　framework　for　assessing　the　resilience　of　urban　lifeline　networks　to　intentional　attacks.　Using　a　game-theoretic　model,　this　framework　can　firstly　predict　the　most　likely　strategies　of　both　the　attacker　and　defender　at　Nash　equilibrium　as　the　preconditions　for　resilience　assessment.　Then　a　new　feature　‘degree　of　recovery’　is　proposed　to　quantify　differences　in　network＇s　performance　(pre-attack　vs.　post-recovery).　The　framework　also　integrates　a　requirement　for　functional　characteristics　in　designing　the　performance　response　function　of　lifeline　networks.　In　the　case　study　of　IEEE　30-bus　network,　the　most　likely　strategies　of　attacker　and　defender　at　Nash　equilibrium　were　figured　out.　Then　the　resilience　of　network　was　assessed　and　thoroughly　discussed.　The　results　showed　that　the　recovery　resource　and　budget　had　different　effects　on　the　resilience.　Furthermore,　it　was　demonstrated　how　the　assessment　framework　can　provide　a　quick　reference　tool　for　optimal　decision-making　under　various　scenarios.　©　2020　Elsevier　Ltd