In　e-commerce,　sellers　can　disclose　product　information　(such　as　quality,　size　information,　function,　and　so　on)　to　make　consumers　understand　the　products.　However,　in　the　process　of　information　disclosure,　consumers　often　fall　into　information　distortion　or　information　loss.　Because　of　its　immutability　and　traceability,　blockchain　can　help　e-commerce　sellers　improve　information　disclosure　and　ensure　the　efficiency　of　information　transmission.　We　study　a　duopoly　competitive　e-commerce　market　in　which　two　e-commerce　sellers　compete　in　information　disclosure.　According　to　whether　to　apply　blockchain,　we　divide　the　sellers＇　decision-making　into　four　research　scenarios　(NN,　BN,　NB,　BB).　Based　on　the　above　four　scenarios,　we　get　the　market　demand　of　different　products　depending　on　the　consumer　utility,　and　further　establish　the　game　model　in　the　competitive　environment.　This　paper　explores　the　impact　of　blockchain　on　information　disclosure　and　consumer　surplus,　and　achieves　the　Nash　equilibrium　of　blockchain　application　for　both　sides.　In　the　expansion　model,　we　study　e-commerce　sellers＇　risk　aversion　and　capital　constraints,　and　further　explore　their　impact　on　blockchain　in　practice.　Finally,　combining　with　blockchain＇s　characteristics,　we　also　analyze　the　impact　of　the　application　of　blockchain　at　other　aspects　on　the　supply　chain.　We　find　that　when　consumers＇　trust　in　information　is　low　or　the　cost　of　blockchain　applications　is　low,　all　e-commerce　sellers　in　competition　will　adopt　blockchain.　In　addition,　when　consumers　have　low　trust　in　information,　it　will　be　difficult　to　achieve　complete　equilibrium　in　the　application　of　blockchain　as　their　risk　aversion　increases.　For　capital　constrained　sellers,　when　the　cost　of　blockchain　application　is　low,　it　will　be　difficult　to　achieve　full　equilibrium　for　blockchain　applicants　as　the　bank　financing　rate　increases.