Considering　that　the　assumption　of　time　consistency　does　not　adequately　reveal　the　mechanisms　of　exit　decisions　of　venture　capital　(VC),　this　study　proposes　two　kinds　of　time-inconsistent　preferences　(i.e.,　time-flow　inconsistency　and　time-point　inconsistency)　to　advance　research　in　this　field.　Time-flow　inconsistency　is　in　line　with　the　previous　time　inconsistency　literature,　while　time-point　inconsistency　is　rooted　in　the　VC　fund＇s　finite　lifespan.　Based　on　the　assumption　about　the　strategies　guiding　future　behaviors,　we　consider　four　types　of　venture　capitalists:　time-consistent,　time-point-inconsistent,　naive,　and　sophisticated　venture　capitalists,　of　which　the　latter　three　are　time-inconsistent.　We　derive　and　compare　the　exit　thresholds　of　these　four　types　of　venture　capitalists.　The　main　results　include:　(1)　time-inconsistent　preferences　accelerate　the　exits　of　venture　capitalists;　(2)　the　closer　the　VC　funds　expiry　dates　are,　the　more　likely　time-inconsistent　venture　capitalists　are　to　accelerate　their　exits;　and　(3)　future　selves　caused　by　time-flow　inconsistency　weaken　the　effect　of　time-point　inconsistency.　Our　study　provides　a　behavioral　explanation　for　the　empirical　fact　of　young　VCs＇　grandstanding.