The　rapid　development　of　sharing　bicycles　has　facilitated　the　last　mile　of　travel　and　provided　new　opportunities　for　the　sustainable　development　of　metro　transportation.　However,　there　is　still　insufficient　literature　on　how　to　promote　the　bicycle-metro　integration　mode.　This　paper　designs　a　bicycle-metro　integrated　model　based　on　evolutionary　game　theory　and　explores　the　evolutionary　mechanism　of　the　sharing　of　bicycles　connection　system　and　metro　system　under　the　subsidy　phasing　out.　The　conditions　for　achieving　different　equilibrium　states　were　discussed　based　on　the　replication　dynamics　equation.　In　order　to　prove　the　evolutionary　game　analysis,　the　system　dynamics　simulation　model　was　used　to　reveal　the　effects　of　the　cost　factor,　subsidy　factor,　reward,　and　penalty　factors　on　the　equilibrium　of　the　integrated　model.　Moreover,　the　values　of　the　influence　factors　that　make　the　system　reach　the　optimal　equilibrium　were　obtained　through　sensitivity　analysis.　The　results　show　that　by　reasonably　adjusting　the　values　of　the　parameters,　sharing　bicycles　connection　systems,　metro　systems　and　connection　travelers　can　reach　an　equilibrium　state　where　they　are　willing　to　cooperate.　Subsidy　phasing-out　policies　for　travelers　were　key　to　promoting　the　equilibrium　of　the　model.　The　unit　price　of　shared　bicycles　has　a　greater　impact　on　users,　and　the　irregular　parking　ratio　changes　have　a　greater　impact　on　the　benefits　of　travelers　compared　to　the　benefits　of　the　metro　system.　In　order　to　promote　bicycle-metro　integration　and　enhance　the　attractiveness　of　metro　transportation,　policies　designed　for　participants　should　be　integrated　with　dynamic　evolution.