Live　streaming　shopping,　as　a　novel　sales　channel,　has　caught　much　attention　from　researchers　and　practitioners.　Its　unique　features,　such　as　the　commission　rate,　fixed　fee　and　number　of　followers　of　the　live　streamer,　appear　different　from　traditional　wholesale-contract　sales　channels.　But　few　studies　have　examined　the　impact　of　these　factors　on　manufacturers’　opening　live　streaming　shopping　channel　decisions.　To　address　this　gap,　we　develop　game　theoretic　models　to　examine　whether　a　manufacturer　should　hire　a　live　streamer　to　open　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel　on　an　e-commerce　platform　where　the　manufacturer＇s　direct　channel　and　third-party　e-retailer　co-exist.　We　consider　the　impact　of　the　commission　rate,　fixed　fee　and　number　of　followers　of　the　live　streamer　on　the　operating　decisions　and　profits　of　the　manufacturer　and　e-retailer.　Then　we　identify　the　threshold-conditions　where　the　manufacturer　and　e-retailer　are　better　off　or　worse　off　by　opening　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel.　We　show　that　opening　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel　may　hurt　or　harm　the　manufacturer＇s　profit,　depending　on　the　interaction　of　above　three　factors.　The　manufacturer　may　be　willing　to　open　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel　when　the　commission　rate　and　fixed　fee　are　both　small,　or　when　the　commission　rate　and　number　of　followers　are　both　large　and　the　fixed　fee　is　small.　The　e-retailer　could　also　benefit　from　opening　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel.　These　insights　appear　novel　in　the　literature.　We　further　show　that　opening　a　live　streaming　shopping　channel　could　improve　the　consumer　surplus.　We　extend　our　model　to　price　competition　to　verify　our　main　conclusions.　These　insights　may　help　manufacturers　decide　whether　or　not　to　open　live　streaming　shopping　channels　and　help　manufacturers　and　extant　retailers　develop　optimal　operating　decisions　and　improve　profits　when　participating　in　live　streaming　shopping.　©　2022　Elsevier　Ltd