Renewable　Portfolio　Standards　(RPS)　and　Carbon　Emission　Trading　(CET)　are　the　policy　instrument　for　China　to　achieve　the　low-carbon　energy　transition.　Changes　in　policy　combinations　will　affect　the　equilibrium　state　of　the　interactive　system　and　bring　uncertain　risks　to　the　expected　effects　of　policy　implementation.　Given　the　assumption　that　the　power　users　undertake　RPS　assessment　and　the　CET　market　is　extended　to　industries　in　addition　to　the　power　generation　industry,　this　paper　first　constructs　a　game　model　in　the　context　of　RPS　and　CET　where　groups　of　power　users　and　thermal　power　manufacturers　jointly　participate.　Then,　with　China＇s　provincial　market　data,　it　analyzed　the　evolution　process　of　group　strategy　under　different　policy　parameters　and　described　the　characteristics　of　the　transition　between　the　stable　and　unstable　states　of　the　system.　Finally,　a　dynamic　and　differentiated　mechanism　design　for　policy　parameters　is　proposed　to　restrain　system　oscillations.　The　simulation　results　reveal　the　interaction　between　market　players＇　strategies,　and　a　quantitative　framework　for　analyzing　system　stability　under　different　policy　parameter　combinations　is　proposed,　which　can　provide　an　analysis　framework　for　China　to　implement　RPS　and　CET　and　deliver　a　relevant　analysis　basis　for　setting　policy　parameters.　©　2023　Elsevier　Ltd