In　the　rapidly　evolving　landscape　of　online　information　dissemination,　managing　rumors　has　become　an　imperative　challenge　for　governments　worldwide.　This　study　employs　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　to　examine　the　behavior　evolution　of　the　government,　online　media,　and　netizens　in　the　process　of　rumor　propagation　under　uncertain　conditions.　The　innovation　of　the　model　lies　in　considering　the　probability　of　successful　rumor　detection　under　government　regulation,　the　uncertainty　of　rumor　dissemination　by　online　media　and　netizens,　and　introducing　a　dynamic　government　penalty　mechanism.　Through　simulation　and　analysis,　we　identify　the　evolutionarily　stable　strategies　of　each　participant　under　different　scenarios　and　provide　specific　governance　strategies　for　each　party　involved.　The　results　reveal　that　appropriate　government　penalties,　proactive　regulation　by　online　media,　and　rational　choices　by　netizens　can　effectively　curb　rumor　spreading.　In　uncertain　environments,　adopting　flexible　policies　and　dynamic　adjustment　mechanisms　is　crucial　for　effective　rumor　governance.　The　results　reveal　that　appropriate　government　penalties,　proactive　regulation　by　online　media,　and　rational　choices　by　netizens　can　effectively　curb　rumor　spreading.　In　uncertain　environments,　adopting　flexible　policies　and　dynamic　adjustment　mechanisms　is　crucial　for　effective　rumor　governance.　This　study　not　only　enriches　the　application　of　evolutionary　game　theory　but　also　offers　practical　strategic　recommendations　for　policymakers　to　address　the　challenges　of　rumor　propagation.　©　The　Author(s),　under　exclusive　licence　to　Springer-Verlag　GmbH　Germany,　part　of　Springer　Nature　2025.