In　order　to　improve　the　mode　share　of　public　transportation,　an　evolutionary　game　model　based　on　the　indifference　threshold　is　established　to　analyze　the　travelers＇　mode　choice　behavior.　The　model　supposes　that　the　travelers＇　behavioral　adjustment　of　decision-making　of　travelers　follows　the　principle　of　random　utility　maximization　only　when　the　perceived　difference　in　utility　between　modes　is　greater　than　the　indifference　threshold;　otherwise,　travelers　choose　randomly.　A　transportation　network　that　includes　private　and　public　transportation　is　presented　as　an　example　to　show　how　travelers　adjust　their　mode　choice　when　traffic　management　policy　is　changed.　We　divided　the　travelers　into　three　categories　based　on　the　online　survey　data:　high　sensitivity,　neutral　sensitivity　and　low　sensitivity　to　cost　difference.　The　results　show　that,　the　proposed　Delta-logit　evolutionary　game　model　has　a　unique　stable　equilibrium　point　and　the　point　is　the　choice　probability　of　the　Delta-logit　stochastic　user　equilibrium.　Moreover,　compared　with　the　logit　evolutionary　game　model,　the　Delta-logit　evolutionary　game　model　can　predict　the　implementation　effect　of　traffic　policy　and　the　time　it　takes　for　the　traffic　system　to　stabilize　more　accurately.　In　addition,　the　degree　of　sensitivity　of　travelers　to　cost　difference　affect　the　implementation　effect　of　the　policy.