In　this　paper,　we　propose　a　new　approach　for　rational　secret　sharing　in　game　theoretic　settings.　The　trusted　center　is　eliminated　in　the　secret　reconstruction　phase.　Every　player　doesn＇t　know　current　round　is　real　round　or　fake　round.　The　gain　of　following　the　protocol　is　more　than　the　gain　of　deviating,　so　rational　player　has　an　incentive　to　abide　the　protocol.　Finally,　every　player　can　obtain　the　secret　fairly.　Our　scheme　is　verifiable　and　any　player＇s　cheating　can　not　work.　Furthermore　the　proposed　scheme　is　immune　to　backward　induction　and　satisfies　resilient　equilibrium.　No　player　of　the　coalition　C　can　do　better,　even　if　the　whole　coalition　C　cheats.　Our　scheme　can　withstand　the　conspiracy　attack　with　at　most　m-1　players.