Sharing　bus　lanes　with　ride-sharing　vehicles　is　beneficial　for　improving　the　utilization　efficiency　of　these　lanes　and　alleviating　urban　traffic　pressure.　This　paper　applies　evolutionary　game　theory　to　explore　the　evolutionary　game　dynamics　of　three　travel　modes-buses,　ride-sharing　vehicles,　and　driving　alone-under　different　sharing　strategy　scenarios　for　bus　lanes.　Before　constructing　the　game　model,　various　influencing　factors　such　as　travel　costs,　time　costs,　and　the　combined　costs　of　ride-sharing　are　quantified　to　calculate　the　cumulative　prospect　values　before　travel.　The　gains　and　losses　in　the　cumulative　prospect　values　are　defined　as　parameter　variables　in　the　game　model,　establishing　a　payoff　matrix　for　the　three　travel　modes:　buses,　ride-sharing　vehicles,　and　private　cars.　During　the　model-solving　process,　the　Lyapunov　first　method　is　used　for　stability　analysis　of　the　equilibrium　points,　resulting　in　three　groups　of　asymptotically　stable　equilibrium　points.　By　rotating　the　parameter　values　according　to　the　actual　circumstances　of　different　sharing　strategies,　the　model　simulates　and　evaluates　the　impact　of　various　sharing　policies　on　the　travel　mode　choices　among　the　three　options.　The　results　indicate　that　the　gain　and　loss　values　in　the　cumulative　prospect　values　of　travel　modes　are　key　factors　influencing　travelers＇　mode　choices.　Under　the　synergistic　effects　of　urban　ride-sharing　policies　and　traffic　system　optimization,　when　the　cumulative　prospect　value　of　ride-sharing　is　a　gain,　travelers　recognize　its　advantages　and　are　willing　to　choose　it.　Conversely,　when　the　cumulative　prospect　value　indicates　a　loss,　travelers　are　more　inclined　to　choose　bus　travel　or　driving　alone.　This　paper　provides　a　theoretical　foundation　for　the　formulation　of　sharing　policies　for　bus　lanes　with　ride-sharing,　contributing　to　improved　utilization　efficiency　of　these　lanes　and　alleviating　urban　traffic　pressure.