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Abstract:
In this paper, we propose an efficient method to break H2-MAC, by using a generalized birthday attack to recover the equivalent key, under the assumption that the underlying hash function is secure (collision resistance). We can successfully recover the equivalent key of H2-MAC in about 2n/2 on-line MAC queries and 2n/2 off-line hash computations with great probability. This attack shows that the security of H2-MAC is totally dependent on the collision resistance of the underlying hash function, instead of the PRF-AX of the underlying compression function in the origin security proof of H2-MAC.
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Source :
International Journal of Security and its Applications
ISSN: 1738-9976
Year: 2012
Issue: 2
Volume: 6
Page: 397-402
ESI Discipline: COMPUTER SCIENCE;
Cited Count:
WoS CC Cited Count: 0
SCOPUS Cited Count:
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count:
Chinese Cited Count:
30 Days PV: 8
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