Due　to　many　social　problems　caused　by　Internet　consumer　finance,　Internet　consumer　finance　regulation　has　always　become　one　of　the　main　concerns　of　governments　and　society.　Based　on　a　novel　three-dimensional　mixed　strategy　game　matrix,　this　paper　constructs　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　for　regulators,　Internet　consumer　financial　institutions,　and　consumers.　In　this　model,　we　establish　the　dynamic　replication　equation　of　the　three　parties　above,　analyze　the　influence　of　factors　on　the　tripartite　strategy　selection　and　discuss　the　stability　of　model　equilibrium　points　through　numerical　simulation.　The　results　show　that　the　model　will　get　six　evolutionary　stable　points　in　Internet　consumer　financial　regulation　under　different　conditions.　Moreover,　strict　regulation,　verification,　and　contract　keeping　are　the　most　ideal　evolutionarily　stable　strategies.　In　addition,　three　critical　factors　affect　the　evolution　results　of　the　three　parties,　namely　losses　to　institutions　caused　by　loose　regulation　and　verification,　punishment　for　loose　verification　under　strict　regulation,　and　losses　from　breaking　the　contract.　©　The　Author(s)　2023.