Based　on　the　analysis　of　China＇s　urban　packaging　waste　recycling　system　and　the　current　situation,　it　is　necessary　to　further　explore　the　evolutionary　scenarios　of　stakeholders＇　behavior　in　recycling　packaging　waste　and　the　structural　characteristics　of　the　recycling　system.　This　paper　establishes　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　involving　the　government,　waste　recyclers　and　urban　residents,　and　simulates　the　behaviors　of　different　subjects　with　numerical　calculations.　The　results　show　that　weak　government　regulation　and　strong　participation　of　recyclers　and　residents　are　the　evolutionary　stable　state　of　the　packaging　waste　recycling　process.　The　initial　behavioral　choices　of　different　recycling　participants　can　influence　the　evolutionary　path.　At　the　early　stage,　strengthening　behavioral　management　and　guidance　for　recyclers　and　residents　can　help　enhance　their　participation.　When　government　management　obtains　results,　the　management　and　supervision　can　be　gradually　reduced,　and　the　leading　role　of　recyclers　in　the　recycling　process　can　be　played.　The　penalty　level　and　subsidy　rate　set　by　the　government　will　influence　the　evolution　path　and　speed,　and　the　motivation　of　stakeholders　will　affect　the　effect　of　recycling.