Incorporating　the　principles　of　loss　aversion　psychology　within　the　context　of　green　housing　stakeholders　–　the　government,　realtors,　and　residents　–　this　study　extends　its　purview　into　an　evolutionary　game　model.　This　model　takes　into　account　the　consequences　of　inaction　in　the　absence　of　government　oversight,　the　additional　loss　incurred　by　realtors　due　to　the　unmarketable　development　of　green　housing,　and　the　psychological　loss　experienced　by　residents　when　their　green　housing　acquisitions　fall　short　of　their　expectations.　To　further　enrich　our　analysis,　three　distinct　scenarios　are　considered　for　the　government:　exclusive　rewards　without　penalties,　exclusive　penalties　without　rewards,　and　a　combination　of　both　rewards　and　penalties.　The　simulation　results　show　that:　(1)　The　initial　probability　values　assigned　to　the　three　parties　do　not　significantly　impact　the　long-term　stable　equilibrium.　Interestingly,　a　higher　initial　probability　value　tends　to　steer　all　three　parties　towards　selecting　the　stable　equilibrium　solution.　(2)　Within　the　context　of　the　three　reward–penalty​　scenarios,　it　becomes　evident　that　an　increase　in　the　magnitude　of　government　rewards　and　penalties　inclines　realtors　towards　a　greater　inclination　to　engage　in　green　housing　development.　Nonetheless,　a　balanced　approach　appears　to　yield　the　most　favorable　results.　(3)　A　sensitivity　analysis　reveals　that　a　heightened　aversion　to　loss　within　the　government＇s　decision-making　process　leads　to　a　higher　likelihood　of　regulatory　intervention.　Conversely,　a　diminished　loss　aversion　mindset　among　realtors　and　residents　correlates　with　an　increased　propensity　for　realtors　to　invest　in　green　housing　development,　while　residents　are　more　inclined　to　purchase　green　housing.　Finally,　corresponding　policy　implications　are　given　according　to　the　conclusions.　©　2023　Economic　Society　of　Australia,　Queensland