This　paper　explores　the　influence　of　the　related　large　shareholders＇　relationship　on　the　real　earnings　management　activities　with　panel　data　of　the　Chinese　listed　firms　in　2013.　Our　findings　indicate　that　the　existence　of　related　large　shareholders＇　relationship　significantly　affects　the　governance　efficiency　of　real　earnings　management.　In　addition,　compared　with　the　independent　companies,　the　relational　companies　have　restrained　the　behavior　of　real　earnings　management.　Furthermore,　the　conclusion　still　holds　in　the　sub-sample　of　non-state-owned　listed　firms.　We　suggest　that　the　existence　of　the　relationship　of　related　large　shareholders　is　helpful　to　restricting　real　earnings　management　and　thus　improve　earnings　quality.