Previous　studies　have　revealed　that　the　relationship　between　bike-sharing　and　the　bus　system　in　connecting　metro　stations　is　substitution　and　supplement.　However,　the　choice　integration　mode　of　users　between　bike-sharing　and　bus　for　the　last-mile　connection　to　the　urban　metro　has　not　been　sufficiently　studied.　This　paper　aims　to　address　this　gap　and　explore　to　promote　stable　connection　integration　while　easing　the　financial　pressure　of　governments.　To　achieve　this,　evolutionary　game　theory　was　employed　to　examine　the　complex　behavior　interaction　between　governments　and　operations,　taking　into　account　subsidy　policy　phase-outs.　This　paper　defined　the　ideal　event　and　analyzed　the　impact　of　critical　factors　on　the　dynamic　evolution　process,　and　gained　valuable　insights.　Subsequently,　the　game　models　and　primary　conclusions　using　actual　traffic　data　were　validated.　Additionally,　a　sensitivity　analysis　of　factors　based　on　the　dynamics　simulation　model　was　conducted.　The　results　demonstrate　that　the　adjustment　of　factors　can　promote　the　integration　model　optimization　on　subsidy　phasing-out.　The　integration　decision　of　factors　with　real　data　provides　a　valuable　reference　for　governments　and　operations.　The　findings　hold　significant　meaning　in　promoting　connection　integration　and　enhancing　the　overall　attractiveness　of　metro　transportation.　©　2013　IEEE.